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The December 1989 European
Community Merger Control
Regulation: A Non-EC
Perspective

Introduction
On December 21, 1989, the Council of the European Communities
passed a merger control regulation requiring mergers' to be approved
by the European Commission. 2 The European Community considered
unified merger control an essential component of the 1992 Common
Market integration.3 While creating exciting opportunities for mergers
within Europe, the EC plan will affect mergers worldwide.
The merger control regulation (the "Regulation") will affect nonEuropean firms in three ways. First, it will simplify mergers with European firms by requiring approval from only one European authority, the
EC Commission. 4 Second, the new Regulation has international antitrust implications affecting mergers and other transactions worldwide.
1. Here "mergers" is used in the broadest sense of the term and includes the
following transactions: statutory mergers, asset sales, stock purchases, share
exchanges, tender offers, and joint ventures.

2. European Antitrust Agreement,

N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at DI, col. 3. The

European Commission is the principal executive branch of the European Community. The new regulation went into effect on September 21, 1990. Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of ConcentrationsBetween Undertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) art. 25, § 1, at 12 (1989) [hereinafter

Regulation].
3. EC NearingAccord on Merger Controls, Wall St.J., Nov. 24, 1989, at CIO, col. 6;
see also Hawk, The ProposedRevisions to theJustice Department'sAntitrust Guidelinesfor International Operations and Recent Developments in EEC Competition Law, 57 ANTITRUST L.J.

299, 308 (1988).
The European Community is working to abolish all barriers to trade within the EC
by 1992. The goal is to promote the free flow of goods and capital across the borders
of the various member states. One of the key components of this plan has been the

harmonization of merger control to best facilitate the free flow of capital as well as
promote the restructuring of Europe's corporate environment to better suit the
needs of the Common Market. See id. See also generally Bertrand, Scramblingfor 1992,
Bus. MARKMNG, Feb. 1989, at 49; Kirkland, Outsider's Guide to Europe in 1992, FORTUNE, Oct. 24, 1988, at 121; Kirkland, Busting the Myth of "1992," 10 BEST OF Bus. Q.
76 (1988); Lamoriello, Completing the Internal Market by 1992: The EC's Legislative Program for Business, Bus. AM., Aug. 1, 1988, at 4.
4. As shall be discussed, the merger must be rather large to fall within the scope
of the new statute. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text. "Turnover" is similar to the American concept of "revenue."
24 CORNELL INT'L LJ.97
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Thus, multinational firms will have to look increasingly to Europe for
approval of their consolidation efforts, regardless of where they implement the merger transaction. Third, the new Regulation is designed to
facilitate the growth of European multinationals and enhance the ability
of European firms to compete in international markets, including nonEuropean markets. Non-EC firms can expect an increase in the size and
competitiveness of European firms, whose growth the European Commission will favor and encourage. This Note will explore each of these
three effects and conclude that while the new Regulation may not
threaten non-European multinationals with "fortress Europe," greater
European influence and competitiveness will accompany the benefits of
simplified access to European merger markets.
To demonstrate the accessibility of European merger markets, this
Note will first present a brief history of EC merger control. In Section
II, this Note will explain and evaluate the filing requirements and criteria for approval under the new Regulation. In Section III, this Note will
discuss the international antitrust implications arising from the Regulation's extraterritorial application, its competition policy, 5 and its effect
on business transactions. In the final section, this Note will explore the
EC's intent and ability to use the new Regulation to enhance the competitiveness of its own firms in international markets.
I.

A Brief History of European Merger Control

The new Regulation was initially considered in 1973 after the Commission first took steps in ContinentalCan 6 to control mergers through Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 7 Article 86 prevents a firm from abusing
its dominant position in the marketplace. 8 In Continental Can, the European Court ofJustice 9 held that a merger that "strengthens" the dominant market position of a firm is an "abuse of dominant position" under
Article 86.10 The troubling aspect of Continental Can was that the Com5. "Competition policy" refers to the standards that the EC uses to protect the

free market environment which is theoretically necessary for the health of industry
and commerce.
6. Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 215, 12

7. See D.
draft).

COMMON MKT. L.R. 199 (1973) [hereinafter Continental Can].
GOYDER, EEC COMPETrTON LAw 323 (1988) (discussing

the 1973

The Treaty of Rome established the EC. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, at 48-49 [hereinafter
Treaty].

8. Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 86.
9. The European Court ofJustice is an EC court that typically has authority to
review Commission decisions. This court has express authority to review Commis-

sion decisions under the new Regulation. See infra notes 163-70 and accompanying

text.
10. Continental Can, 1973 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 215; see also Schmitt, Multinational
Corporationsand Merger Control in Community Antitrust Law, in EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL 169, 174 (K. Hopt ed. 1982).
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mission voided a merger only after it occurred.1 1 In addition, Article 86
was severely limited in merger control applications because the Commission could only apply it to firms that already held a dominant market
position. 12 To meet such concerns, a series of merger control regulation drafts was promulgated. ' But efforts to draft a regulation stalled
because Germany and England fiercely opposed the proposed
regulation. 14

Momentum for the proposed regulation resumed in 1987 when the
Commission succeeded in applying Article 8515 to stock acquisitions. 16
In contrast to Article 86, which regulates abuses of dominant market
position, Article 85 prohibits agreements that restrict, prevent, or distort competition within the Common Market. 17 In 1966, the Commission had concluded that Article 85 would not apply to mergers,1 8 but
the result in Philip Morris, which applied Article 85 to stock acquisitions,
showed that the Commission had reversed its earlier position.' 9 Within
one month after Philip Morris, the EC Member States moved substan20
tially forward with another merger regulation proposal.
Due to Commission threats to further apply Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome as a makeshift merger regulation, the various Member States acquiesced to the inevitable adoption of a new merger control
regulation. 2 ' Member States recognized Articles 85 and 86 as inadequate because, inter alia, the Commission could regulate mergers only by
dismantling them after they had occurred. 22 On December 21, 1989,
23
the EC Member States unanimously approved the new Regulation,
which the Commission began enforcing on September 21, 1990.24
11. Banks, Mergers and PartialMergers Under EEC Law, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 266,
274 (1988).
12. Hawk, supra note 3, at 309.
13. Commission Proposalfor a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 16 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. C 92) 1 (1973), amended by 25 Oj.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 36) 3 (1982), 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 51) 8 (1984), 31 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 130) 4 (1988), and 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 22) 14 (1989).
14. See European Antitrust Agreement, supra note 2.
15. Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 85.
16. British Am. Tobacco (and Philip Morris) v. Commission, 1987 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 4487, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405 (1987) [hereinafter Philip Morris];
see also Hawk, supra note 3, at 310-11.
17. See generally Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 85.
18. Banks, supra note 11, at 257-60.
19. Philip Morris, 1987 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 4487.
20. Hawk, supra note 3, at 311.
21. Id. at 310; Commission Preparedto Withdraw Merger Control Proposal, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,926 (1987); Fine, EC Merger Control in the 1990s: An Overview of
the Draft Regulation, 9 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 513, 514-15 (1989). See generally Banks,
supra note 11, at 272-74.
22. Banks, supra note 11, at 274 (Banks also lists other reasons for inadequacy).
23. EuropeanAntitrust Agreement, supra note 2, at Dl.
24. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 25, § 1.
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E. Overview of the New Merger Regulation
The major benefits of the new Regulation result from greater simplicity
in European merger control. The new Regulation will allow non-EC 25
firms to merge with approval from only one European body, the EC
Commission. If the specified threshold requirements of the Regulation
are met, the merging firms are not required to gain approval from the
various Member States. With approval being granted in advance of the
merger, the risk of a costly order to divest is minimized.
The new Regulation also offers non-European firms the benefits of
simplified access to European markets through merger transactions.
Non-European firms can purchase European manufacturing, marketing,
distribution, and service firms or subsidiaries with sole approval of the
EC Commission. Acquiring firms no longer need to gain approval from
numerous countries to assemble a transaction that involves firms from
more than one Member State. Instead of structuring deals that target
products or markets of individual Member States, non-EC firms can now
structure deals with the whole of Europe in mind.
As this Note shall explain, only firms engaged in large transactions
will reap the benefits of the new Regulation. Firms must meet threshold
requirements of size (in terms of European Community currency) to
qualify for review under the Regulation. Also, parties to a merger applying for Commission approval must be compatible with Community antitrust policy which includes consideration of the economic interests of
the Community.
Non-European business executives should temper enthusiasm for
the Regulation with the realization that approval of mergers by the
Commission will have a political component and will be subject to possible delay through judicial review. Because of the Regulation's underlying policy objectives, the possibility for discrimination against nonEuropeans does exist. In approving mergers, the Commission must
consider the competitiveness of European firms not only within Europe
but in markets around the world. Indeed, the growth of European
industry and its ability to compete in international markets is a stated
policy objective of the new Regulation. Such policy objectives may work
against non-EC firms.
A.

Threshold Requirements for Filing with the Commission

As of September 21, 1990, parties to mergers that satisfy threshold sizerequirements must file for approval with the EC. 26 The merger Regulation applies to "all concentrations 2 7 having a community dimension."' 28
The criterion of "community dimension" is met when (1) the aggregate
25. "Non-EC firm" is used to refer to firms from countries that are not members
of the EG.
26. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 25, § 1.
27. Id. at art. 3, §§ 1-2 ("Concentrations" include mergers, asset sales, stock
purchases, share exchanges, tender offers, and in some cases, joint ventures).
28. Id. at art. 1, § 1.
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worldwide turnover of all the undertakings 2 9 concerned is more than
five billion ECU (about $6.8 billion), and (2) the aggregate Communitywide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is
more than 250 million ECU (about $341 million).3 0 The Regulation
does not apply, however, where "each of the undertakings concerned
achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State."''s In 1994 the Commission
will review the five billion ECU threshold and decide whether to lower it
32
to two billion ECU (about $2.7 billion).
While the threshold levels are relatively high, the rules for calculation of turnover place more mergers within the scope of the Regulation
than one might expect. The calculation of the turnover thresholds
involves more firms than simply the actual parties to the transactions: it
also includes turnover of the controlling and controlled entities of the
parties.
Turnover is calculated by adding together all "amounts derived by
the undertakings concerned in the preceding financial years from the
sale of products and the provision of services falling within the undertakings' ordinary activities after deduction of sales rebates and of value
added tax and other taxes directly related to turnover." 3 3 As mentioned, firms that are essentially controlled by or control the merging
entities are also included in the turnover calculation. 34 Likewise, the
29. "Undertakings" are the European equivalent of "firms" in American corporate and partnership law.
30. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 1, § 2.
31. Id
32. European Antitrust Agreement, supra note 2, at D2. It is interesting that the
phrase "concentration having a Community dimension" is defined in terms of turnover and not competition within the EC. "The duty to notify and suspend implementation [of the merger] applies even if the merger has no anti-competitive effects."
Korah & Lasok, Philip Morris and its Aftermath-Merger Control?, 25 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 333, 365 (1988). The turnover threshold requirement results in notification for
only large mergers. See id. The policy considerations of the EC will be discussed
later in this Note. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
The merger control Regulation also covers banks and insurance companies,
although turnover is calculated differently. For banks, "revenues [turnover] would
be regarded as about one-tenth of their assets, so that a bank merger would be
reviewed if the resulting bank's assets came to more than about 50 billion ECU's, or
$68 billion." EuropeanAntitrust Agreement, supra note 2, at D2; see also Regulation, supra

note 2, at art. 5, § 3(a). The requirement for "community-wide turnover" is calculated in a similar manner. See id. For insurance companies, turnover is calculated
using "the value of gross premiums." Id. at art. 5, § 3(b).
33. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 5, § 1 (turnover derived from internal operations within a group shall not be included in this calculation).
34. The inclusion of turnover from the various entities associated with the merger

is determined as follows: "[Wihere the concentration consists in the acquisition of
parts, whether or not constituted as legal entities, of one or more undertakings, only
the turnover relating to the parts which are the subject of the transaction shall be
taken into account with regardto the seller orsellers." Id. at art. 5, § 2 (emphasis added).
Any firm affiliated with the merging parties shall be included in the calculation of
turnover if (1) half of its capital or business assets are owned by one of the merging
parties, (2) at least half of its voting rights are owned by one of the merging parties,
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turnover of any other undertakings controlled by the firms that essentially control the merging entities is also included in the turnover calculation. 35 Because the Regulation addresses control through "indirect"
means other than actual ownership - for example, the ability to appoint
over half of the board - controlling corporations which are removed
from the merging entities through a chain of parent-subsidiary relationships may still be included in the calculation. 36 Thus, under the Regulation, the controlling and controlled entities of the merging parties are
identified and included in the turnover calculation, no matter how far
removed from the merging entities.
There is, however, an important exception for calculation of the
turnover of the selling firm: where only part of a firm is sold, only the
turnover of that part is included in the calculation. 3 7 Thus, in an asset
sale or other transaction that can be characterized as a sale, the seller's
turnover includes only those parts of the firm actually being sold. 38 On
the other hand, the exception for sellers does not apply to statutory
39
mergers or joint ventures.
The "seller's exception" is significant because it means that the
structure of a transaction may determine if it meets merger Regulation
threshold requirements. For instance, if A corporation merges its subsidiary B corporation with C corporation in such a way as to avoid the
appearance of a sale, then the turnover of A, B, and C will be included in
the calculation under the Regulation. 40 But if A sells its subsidiary, B, to
C, then only the turnover of B and C is used in the threshold calculation. 4 1 If the aggregate turnover of B and C falls below the Regulation's
threshold requirements, then the Commission will have no jurisdiction
(3) any of the merging parties has the power to appoint at least half of the members
of the affiliated firm's board of directors, board of managers or other bodies representing the firm, or (4) any of the merging parties has the right to manage its affairs.

Id. at art. 5, § 4(b). Furthermore, if any of the affiliated companies have, either
directly or indirectly, the ownership, voting, management rights or powers listed in

(1) through (4), above, over any of the merging parties, then they are included in the
turnover calculation, togetherwith any otherfirms over which they, directly or indirectly,
have any of the powers listed in (1) through (4). Id. at art. 5, § 4(d).

35. Obviously, control sometimes exists with less than half ownership of all outstanding voting common stock. But given the comprehensiveness of the Regulation,

it is unlikely that any firm having effective control or being effectively controlled by
one of the merging parties will escape the language of the Regulation.
36. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 5, § 4(b). For example, suppose A owns 60
percent.of B, B owns 60 percent of C, and C merges with D. A's turnover is included
because A has the power to appoint over half of C's board, to exercise over half of
the voting rights in C, and to effectively manage C's affairs. See id.
37. Compare id. at art. 5, § 2, with id. at art. 5, § 4.
38. "Parts" of a firm being sold do not have to be legal entities for purposes of
the Regulation. Id. at art. 5, § 2.
39. Joint ventures are also covered by the Regulation. See infra notes 241-49 and
accompanying text.

40. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 5, § 4; see also supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
41. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 5, § 2.
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over the transaction. Hence, the structure of a transaction becomes crucial for jurisdictional purposes.
The "seller's exception" effectively excludes the turnover of the
parent corporation from the threshold calculation in an actual sale, as in
an asset sale, but includes the parent's turnover when the parent corporation does not relinquish all of its ownership rights in the transaction.
While asset sale transactions may seem superior for successorship liability reasons, the EC merger Regulation favors transactions other than
sales for jurisdictional purposes. As this Note argues, EC jurisdiction
benefits companies by eliminating the prerogative of national authorities
42
to review a transaction and by allowing pre-approval of mergers.
Thus, in some instances, realization of the benefits of the new Regulation will depend on how the deal is structured.
The net result of the Regulation's rules for turnover calculation is
that the five billion ECU and 250 million ECU thresholds are met more
easily than might be expected. Calculating these thresholds is critical
for firms who wish to know whether they must file with the EC. 4 3 Executives should not think their firms cannot qualify for approval under the
EC simply because a merger is between one of their low earning subdivisions and another firm. Likewise, the threshold requirements should
not fool executives into thinking that their firms do not have to file with
the EC for approval because a transaction only involves one of their
firm's subdivisions. While the threshold requirements are high, they can
be easily met when a large firm is involved in a merger transaction.
Another major exception to the threshold requirements should be
noted. Member States may refer mergers to the Commission that are
below the threshold requirements and that threaten to have a significant
adverse effect in a Member State. 4 4 This exception allows Member
States - such as Italy, which has no antitrust agencies - to use the
Regulation to protect their own markets. 45 Parties to mergers in countries that are free of merger controls should be aware that they may fall
under EC regulation regardless of the size of the transaction.
B.

Filing Requirements

The purpose of the filing requirement is to allow the Commission to
identify transactions that may have a negative impact on competition
within the Common Market. After firms file with the EC, the Commission conducts an initial review to assess whether the proposed merger or
other transaction is compatible with Community competition policy. EC
approval may take up to four months, but the Commission may approve
46
many transactions within one month after filing.

42.
43.
44.
45.
NAT'L
46.

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 22, § 3.
Ferry & Vig, New EC Control Regulation Has Important Antitrust Ramifications,
L. J., Feb. 26, 1990, at 32, col. 2.
Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 10, §§ 1-2.
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Mandatory Filing

Whenever merging parties meet the threshold requirements 4 7 and fall
into the jurisdictional scope of the Regulation, 4 8 they must file with the
Commission. 4 9 Parties must notify the Commission within "one week
after the conclusion of the agreement, or the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest." 50 In a merger, both
parties must file.51 In an acquisition, whether an asset purchase, tender
52
offer, or stock acquisition, only the purchasing party has to file.
Without exception, notification must occur prior to the merger's
53
implementation.
Parties to a merger should not think they do not have to file simply
because their transaction will have no anti-competitive effects in the
Common Market. "[T]he test of whether a duty to notify arises is different from that of whether the merger is in fact anti-competitive." 54 The
threshold and jurisdictional requirements of the Regulation are
designed to identify mergers with a "Community dimension" regardless
55
of their effect on competition.
2. Suspension of the Transaction
Firms that are required to notify the Commission are also required to
suspend implementation of the merger until three weeks after notification. 56 The Commission has one month from the day it receives notification to implement proceedings5 7 based on whether the merger falls
within the threshold requirements and geographic scope of the Regulation and whether the merger "raise[s] serious doubts as to its compatibility with the [C]ommon [M]arket." 5 8 For mergers that raise serious
doubts about compatibility with competition policy, the Commission
must make its decision within four months. 59 Once the Commission has
initiated proceedings, it may suspend implementation of the merger
47. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 190-218 and accompanying text.
49. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 4, § 1; see also Fine, supra note 21, at 520.

An important exception to this requirement is that banks and insurance companies
that hold stock on a temporary basis are not required to file with the Commission as

long as they do not exercise their voting rights. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 3,
§ 5(a).
50. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 4, § 1.
51. Compare id. at art. 4, § 2, with id. at art. 3, § 1(a).
52. Compare id. at art. 4, § 2, with id. at art. 3, § 1(b).

53. Id. at art. 7, § 1.
54. Fine, supra note 21, at 520. Even mergers that satisfy the 25 percent market

share presumption of compatibility are not exempt from the notification requirement. Id. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
55. See Fine, supra note 21, at 520.
56. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 7, § 1.

57. Id. at art. 10, § 1. The period of time may be increased to six weeks at the
request of an EC member state. Id.at art. 9, § 2; see also infra notes 123-28 and
accompanying text.
58. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 6, § 1.

59. Id. at art. 10, §§ 2-3.
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until it makes its final decision approving the merger. 60 Unless the parties fail to provide the Commission with the requisite information, 6 1 the
longest time needed for Commission approval is four months. 62 If the
Commission fails to take any action within the Regulation's time deadlines, the merger is automatically deemed compatible. 6 3 To prevent
serious damage to any of the merging parties, the Commission may
waive the requirement of suspension. 6 4 The Commission, however,
may condition the waiver upon the parties' preservation of effective
65
competition.
3. Penalties
Violators of EC rules are subject to fines and penalties. For "intentionally or negligently" implementing a concentration without approval or
without notice to the Commission, the undertakings concerned-those
firms used in the calculation of turnover as discussed above-can be
fined up to ten percent of their aggregate turnover.6 6 For example, the
Commission could apparently fine the merging firms up to ten percent
of their turnover plus ten percent of the turnover of all firms that they
either control or that control them.6 7 The "gravity of the infringement"6 8 and "size of the fine... depends on whether the party or parties deliberately or negligently failed to consider that the merger had a
60. Id at art. 7, § 2. An exception to the suspension requirement is granted for
public takeovers. Implementation of a public takeover is allowed to proceed if the
acquiring parties have notified the Commission by the date the bid is announced and
"provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question" until the Commission approves the transaction. Id. at art. 7, § 3.
Securities transactions on regulated public exchanges are also granted an exception that makes them valid during the period of suspension "unless the buyer and
seller knew or ought to have known that the transaction was carried out in contravention" of the suspension provisions. Id. at art. 7, § 5.
61. Id at art. 10, § 4. If the Commission has had to request information or order
an investigation pursuant to the Regulation's Articles 11 and 12, the Commission
may suspend the time period deadlines for its decision. Id In such cases, the transaction may also be suspended because the Commission has not reached its final decision and, at its own discretion, decides to protect its ability to declare the transaction
incompatible with the Common Market and to require the transaction's cessation. Id.
at art. 7, § 2. This exception may seriously undermine the time tables imposed upon
the Commission and is a threat to the financing necessary for merger transactions.
62. However, "[w]here the Court ofJustice giv [sic] ajudgment which annuls the
whole or part of a Commission decision .... the [time] periods laid down.., shall
start again from the date of the judgment." Id. at art. 10, § 6.
63. Id.
64. Id. at art. 7, § 4.
65. Id. Further suspensions are permitted if the undertakings fail to supply the
necessary information. Id. at art. 10, § 4.
66. Id. at art. 14, § 2. In earlier drafts of the Regulation, there was some controversy about whether the ten percent limitation applied to penalties imposed for failure to notify the Commission. Under the new Regulation, there is no ten percent
ceiling for failure to notify the Commission. Id. at art. 14, § 1(a). There is, however,
a 50,000 ECU ceiling for such a fine. Id
67. Id. at art. 5 (on calculation of turnover).
68. Id. at art. 14, § 3.
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Community dimension." '6 9 In addition, the Commission may impose
fines for supplying "incorrect or misleading information in a notification," 70 for failing to supply information pursuant to a request, 7' and
72
for failure to produce books and business records in complete form.
C.

EC Competition Policy Compatibility Standards

Under the new Regulation, mergers and other transactions are
approved based upon their compatibility with EC competition policy.
EC competition policy is defined largely through the concept of "dominant position." The Commission's standard for approving a particular
transaction is stated as follows: "A concentration which creates or
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common
73
market."
The Regulation allows no exceptions for approval in failing to meet
these criteria; however, it does list a series of factors that the Commission must consider when applying the above standard. In making its
appraisal the Commission shall take into account:
(a) the need to preserve and develop effective competition within the
common market in view of, among other things, the structure of all
(b)

the markets concerned and the actual or potential competition from
undertakings located either within or without the Community;
the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, the opportunities available to suppliers
and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and
services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers,
and the development of technical and economic progress provided
that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to
74
competition.

The Commission's method of approving "compatible" transactions
must be analyzed in three parts: (1) the concept of dominant position in
69. Fine, supra note 21, at 520 (emphasis added).
70. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 14, § 1(b).
71. Id at art. 14, § 1(c) - (d). The Commission has investigative powers, including
the power to request information, under Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the Regulation.
72. Id at art. 14, § 1(d). Penalties between 1,000 ECU and 50,000 ECU may be
assessed. Id. at art. 14, § 1. The Commission has investigative powers to examine
books, demand oral explanations on the spot, demand copies of records, and "enter
any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings." Id. at art. 13, § 1(d). If
a firm refuses to allow the Commission to exercise these investigative powers or fails
to expeditiously supply requested information, the firm may be fined up to 25,000
ECU for each day that it delays. Id. at art. 15, § 1. The Commission can also impose
fines of up to 100,000 ECU for each day's failure to comply with the Commission's
ultimate decision regarding the merger. Id. at art. 15, § 2. The Court ofJustice has
unlimited jurisdiction to reduce or increase fines or penalties. Id. at art. 16.
73. Id. at art. 2, § 3. For the affirmative but almost identically worded standard,
see id. at art. 2, § 2.
74. Id. at art. 2, § 1.

1991

EC Merger Control Regulation

terms of its technical and traditional meaning for previous EC competition policy under Article 86; (2) the Regulation's requirement that
transactions not be approved if they would result in competition being
"significantly impeded in the common market; ' 75 and (3) the role that
the factors mentioned above will play in the Commission's determination of compatibility.
1. Dominant Position
An important objective of the merger Regulation is to protect competition within the Common Market. The Commission attempts to identify
the creation, strengthening, or abuse of a monopoly or "dominant position." This concept of "dominant position" is crucial to an understanding of the merger Regulation's competition policy. Under the
Regulation, "[a] concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly
impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be
declared incompatible with the common market." 76 The concept of
"dominant position" explicitly limits the accumulation of monopoly
power. The European Court ofJustice defines dominant position as "a
position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables
it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant
market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the
consumers." 77 The underlying axiom of this definition is independence
from normal competitive market forces.
The Commission assesses "dominance" under Article 86 based on
guidelines set down by the European Court ofJustice in United Brands78
and Hoffmann-La Roche.79 Prior to the adoption of the merger Regulation, Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome governed mergers. "Dominant
position" was composed of three components under Article 86: (a) market share, (b) product market, and (c) geographic market. 8 0 Because the
new Regulation expressly incorporates the term "dominant position" in
75. Id. at art. 2, § 3.
76. Id.

77. Hoffinann-La Roche & Co.v. Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 461,
520, 38, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8527 (1979) [hereinafter Hoffmann-La Roche];
see also Schmitt, supra note 10, at 175. Note that "dominant position" is defined here

as it has been used to apply Article 86, and the same definitions and principles will

likely apply to the new Regulation. Lending support to this hypothesis is the argument that the merger control Regulation was not drafted in a vacuum but in the
context of the previous merger controls developed under Article 86. The concept of
dominant position was not idle drafting but was one of the final alterations to the
drafts preceding the final draft. Compare Proposalfor a Merger Control Regulation, 32 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 22) 14, art. 2, § 2, (1989), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 60,040

(1989) [hereinafter Proposal], with Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, §§ 2-3.
78. United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 207, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8429 (1978) [hereinafter United Brands].
79. Hoffmann-La Roche, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 461; see also Schmitt, supra note

10, at 175.
80. See Schmitt, supra note 10, at 176-78.
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its antitrust test, it is likely that market share, product market, and geographic market will be components of the Commission's analysis under
the new Regulation.
a. Market Share
The merger control Regulation contains a rebuttable presumption that
anything below a twenty-five percent market share is compatible with the
Community's competition policy. 8 ' The presumption most likely
applies to each product made by the merging firms.8 2 The smaller the
market share, the less likely the Commission will overturn a presumption of compatibility. "[A]s the relevant market shares decline, so the
additional factors [needed to show market dominance] gain in
importance: there must be more of them, and they must be more
'8 3
conclusive."
Exactly what is an acceptable market share is open to debate and
varies on a case by case basis. Factors that the Commission may use to
assess the acceptability of a large market share or to overcome the presumption of compatibility include the following:
barriers to entry; the strategic and economic potence of the undertaking
in question; its ability to resist competition from other undertakings
should it emerge; the fluidity of the product market in question, in terms
of changing demand (an undertaking might have a high market in a product but demand for that product might be ephemeral
in nature) and the
84
rate of cross-over in the industry concerned.
Generally, market shares of eighty percent or more are evidence of
dominance, 8 5 but the difficulty in accurately assessing the relevant product market and the possibility "that an undertaking might have a market
share of 80 percent and yet economically not be in a dominant position" 8 6 has prevented a threshold presumption of incompatibility from
87
being established.
The calculation of market share in and of itself is quite problematic.
For instance, in one investigation, the market share of vitamin B-12 was
vigorously disputed. The drug manufacturer argued that the Commission should define the market in terms of the 100 diseases that vitamin
B- 12 treats. The drug manufacturer further argued that under this anal-

8 1.

Regulation, supra note 2, preamble.
82. See Korah & Lasok, supra note 32, at 362 (discussing the 20 percent presump-

tion of an earlier draft). For a discussion of product markets, see infra notes 90-101
and accompanying text.

83. Schmitt, supra note 10, at 176.
84. J. Weiler, Discussion Report: Colloquium on MultinationalCorporationsin European
Corporate and Antitrust Laws, 28-31 May 1980 at the European University Institute in Flo-

rence, in EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL 189, 207 (K. Hopt ed. 1982). The factors that
Weiler discusses, as related to market share, are similar to the list of factors adopted
by the Community for the purpose of evaluating mergers against competition policy.
See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § l(a)-(b).
85. Schmitt, supra note 10, at 175.

86. Weiler, supra note 84, at 207.
87. See id.
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ysis it had less than one percent of the market. The German Cartel
Office, which is responsible for antitrust violations in Germany and
whose rulings were being challenged before the EC, defined the market
share of B-12 in terms of only three diseases and thereby argued that the
manufacturer had a monopoly market share.88 Such disputes have persuaded the Commission, when applying Article 85, to analyze market
share in relation to the actual product that is threatened by monopoly
control.8 9 The Commission will probably use similar guidelines when
applying the merger control Regulation.
b.

Product Market

While "market share" is concerned with determining what percentage of
the market a firm may control without adversely affecting competition,
"product market" is a criterion used to determine the relevant market
requiring analysis. "Product market" is thus one of the defining parameters of "market share."
The EC carefully scrutinizes product market. Compatibility with EC
markets under Article 86 has depended on "the peculiar features of the
relevant industry, and particularly to the fact that each [product] constitutes a separate market." 90 The fact that a firm may dominate the general market for the type of product in question is irrelevant if the firm
controls only a modest portion of the specific relevant market as defined
by the Commission. 9 '
In defining a product market, the actual uses of a product, rather
than technical names, are determinative. For instance, in the vitamin B12 case, 9 2 the relevant product market in terms of vitamin B-12 uses was
the determinative issue in the dispute. Fairness of competition within
narrowly defined product markets is what the Commission is seeking to
protect with the new Regulation. "The concept of the relevant market
implies that there can be effective competition between the products
which form part of [the market] and this presupposes that there is sufficient degree of interchangeabilitybetween all the products forming part of
the same market."19 3 "Interchangeability" between products is the crucial aspect in determining the range of products over which the Commission will calculate market share.
In some instances, the EC may assess only a very specific market.
For example, in Continental Can,94 the European Court of Justice
annulled a Commission decision because it felt the distinction between
88. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 461.
89. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
90. Schmitt, supra note 10, at 176.
91. In Hoffmann-La Roche, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, the Court of Justice
disregarded the fact that Roche was the world's largest vitamin manufacturer and

only considered Roche's market share for B-12 vitamins. Schmitt, supra note 10, at
176.
92. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
93. Schmitt, supra note 10, at 176 (emphasis added).
94. Continental Can, 1973 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 215.
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markets for various canned containers had not been sufficiently
defined. 95 The Court of Justice was concerned about possible differences among markets for "light containers for canned meat products
... , light containers for canned seafood ....
[and] metal closures for
the food packing industry other than crown corks." 96 The Court ofJustice thus held the Commission to a strict standard in showing the appropriateness of its product market definitions. As demonstrated here and
in the vitamin B example above, defining the relevant product market
may significantly affect whether the Commission or the Court ofJustice
will find a merger compatible with the Common Market.
Because the Commission's assessment of a merger's anti-competitive effects must be made within four months of the filing date 9 7 - and
in many cases even sooner 98 - parties to a merger should prepare in
advance to argue for the most favorable product market definition. 9 9
Parties should compile favorable data on product uses and product markets from the outset of the transaction. The Commission may delay
authorization of a merger if the parties fail to supply requested
information.10 0
If possible, parties should structure a transaction so the Commission will be increasingly likely to define a product market in a way
favorable to the transaction. For example, if an American software manufacturer specializing in word processing wishes to acquire the marketing and distribution divisions of a Dutch high-technology firm, the
American firm may want to avoid acquiring the rights to any of the
Dutch firm's word processing products. This strategy is more likely to
result in the Commission finding a favorable product market status for
the American firm.' 0 '
c.

Geographic Market

When the relevant product market covers the entire Community, Article
86 is likely to apply. But when a relevant market covers only a part of
the Community, the application of any test for compatibility, including
application of the new merger Regulation, becomes more difficult.i02
The relevant market must be defined in geographic terms before the
Commission can find a concentration to be incompatible.
The Court ofJustice defined a single geographic market as "an area
where the objective conditions of competition applying to the product in
95. Schmitt, supra note 10, at 176-77.
96. Id.
97. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 2.
98. Id.
99. The parties may state their views at hearings before the Commission. Id. at
art. 18, §§ 1, 3.
100. Id. at art. 10, § 4.
101. The definition of a geographic market may also be important in determining
whether the Commission will transfer jurisdiction to an appropriate Member State.
See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
102. See Schmitt, supra note 10, at 177.
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question must be the same for all traders." 10 3 Differences in tariffs
between countries do not create different geographical markets, 1° 4 but
factors such as marketing strategy from a single sales center or national
market organizations are relevant. 10 5 Under Article 86, the Commission
currently must find abuse of a dominant position within a single geo10 6
Abuse
graphic market of "a substantial part of the common market."
of a dominant position within a geographic market that is only local in
character will not warrant intervention by the Commission under Article
86.107 Thus, to apply Article 86 the Commission must find: (1) abuse of
a dominant position, (2) under roughly equal conditions for competition, (3) for a relevant product market, and (4) in a market that is a "substantial part of the common market." Because the merger Regulation
adopts the language of "dominant position," it is likely the Commission
will apply similar requirements to the merger Regulation.
"Strengthening or Creating a Dominant Position"
In some respects, the new merger Regulation creates a more stringent
standard than Article 86. Article0 886 was applied to mergers based on
"abuse" of a dominant position.'
Furthermore, Article 86 was limited
because it required that one merging party already dominate the market
prior to the transaction and that the merger result in "a significant lessening of competition." 10 9 In contrast, the new merger control Regulation applies to the "strengthening" or "creating" of a dominant position
that could significantly impede the development or maintenance of competition.11° Actual "abuse" of market position is not necessary under
the new Regulation. The Regulation requires only that the "creating"
or "strengthening" of a situation could potentially lead to "abuse." Any
merger could fall under the merger Regulation's definition of incompatibility if it "creates" a dominant position, even if none of the parties
have a dominant position. This is a lower threshold for finding incompatibility than under Article 86.
d.

103. Id.
104. Id
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The peculiarities of the effects of dominant position on a local market are also
explicitly addressed by the new Regulation. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 9. The
Commission may grant national authorities the prerogative to review mergers
adversely affecting local markets even though the Commission would otherwise have
at art. 9, § 3; see also infra notes 123-28 and accompanyexclusive jurisdiction. See id.
ing text.
108. Schmitt, supra note 10, at 178.
109. Hawk, supra note 3, at 309.
110. Under Continental Can, abuse under Article 86 may occur through the
"strengthening" of a dominant position. ContinentalCan, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
215; see also Schmitt, supra note 10, at 178.
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2. Impeding Effective Competition
The new Regulation rejects any transaction "which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be
significantly impeded in the common market."" 'I Previous drafts of the Regulation omitted the word "significantly." ' 1 2 "Significantly," as a term of
construction, is ambiguous. Through construction of this term, the
adopted Regulation appears to give the Commission some flexibility in
permitting mergers or other transactions which marginally inhibit competition. But the list of factors in Article 2, Section 1 of the Regulation,
provides the Commission with some guidance as to the meaning of "significantly impeded." Ultimately, these factors will be decisive in any
Commission decision approving or disapproving a transaction.
3.

Factors Considered by the Commission

The Commission considers the following factors when determining if a
transaction "significantly" impedes competition:
(a) the need to preserve and develop effective competition within
the common market in view of, among other things, the structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential
competition from undertakings located either within or without
the Community;
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their
economic and financial power, the opportunities available to
suppliers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any
legal or other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for
the relevant goods and services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of technical
and economic progress provided that it is to consumers
advan1 13
tage and does not form an obstacle to competition.
The above factors can be divided into two types. First, some of the
factors address typical concerns of unrestrained competition. Such factors assist the Commission in determining "dominant position." 114
Second, some of the factors address national concerns other than freedom of competition.
The first category of factors addresses free market concerns related
to the EC's traditional conception of "dominant position," ' 1 5 including
supply and demand, barriers for new enterprises entering the market,
and "the structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential competition from undertakings either within or without the Community
.... -116 This language requires the Commission to consider international competition in markets other than the EC. Community officials
111.
112.
113.
114.

Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § 3 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Proposal, supra note 77, at art. 2, § 2.
Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § 1.
See supra notes 76-110 and accompanying text.

115. Id.
116. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § 1 (emphasis added).
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have indicated that they would consider a transaction's effect on "actual
and potential competition, both inside and outside the community." 117
Thus, the Commission could reject a merger if the parties held dominant positions in non-EC markets, even if the merger was acceptable
within the bounds of Europe. 118 This "international" criterion could
profoundly impact non-EC firms, especially international conglomerates
who find themselves barred from mergers in Europe because of their
market dominance elsewhere in the world. Through this "international" criterion, the EC could exert considerable influence in favor of
EC firms in non-European markets. 119
The second category of factors addresses national concerns other
than freedom of competition, such as "the development of technical and
economic progress."' 2 0 For instance, the Commission may approve a
joint venture that restrains competition if it will provide technological
benefits to the entire Community that far outweigh damage caused by
the restraint of competition. The Commission's consideration of "technical and economic progress" is, however, strictly modified by the language requiring that the transaction "is to consumers [sic] advantage
and does not form an obstacle to competition."'12 1 Unlike earlier drafts of the
Regulation, "technical and economic progress" is not an exception
which trumps Community competition policy; 122 instead, it is merely
one of many factors considered in a general policy of unrestrained
competition.
An interesting question is whether the Regulation's language concerning "obstacle[s] to competition" will prevent all transactions that
even marginally hinder competition. If the Commission or the Court of
Justice interprets this language in such a restrictive way, then the factors
discussed above may become meaningless. In light of the language in
Article 2, however, Sections 2 and 3 prohibit concentrations only if they
"significantly impede" competition, and the Commission and the Court
of Justice may interpret "obstacle to competition" flexibly to permit
minimal restraints of competition if other Community interests are
served.
4.

Summary of the Commission's Competition Policy under the Regulation

The Regulation's competition policy prohibits a firm from creating or
strengthening a "dominant position" that significantly impedes competition. Considerations in interpreting this standard include the EC's
traditional interpretation of "dominant position" under Article 86 and
the factors listed in the Regulation under Article 2, Section 1. These
117. EuropeanAntitrust Agreement, supra note 2, at D2 (emphasis added).

118. The Commission is required to study other international markets and suggest
ways that Member States could gain fairer treatment in those markets. See infra notes
256-62 and accompanying text.
119. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
120. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2,§ I(b).

121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. See, e.g., Proposal, supra note 77, at art. 2, § 3.
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factors include competition in international markets other than the EC
and national interests other than unrestrained competition, such as the
"technical and economic" advancement of the Community. The Commission and the Court ofJustice must balance these factors when inter-

preting and applying EC competition policy.
D. Regulation of Mergers by the Various Member States
One major benefit of the new Regulation is that parties to a merger only
need to seek approval from one European authority, the EC Commission. This necessitates that the EC have exclusive jurisdiction over

approval of mergers with a European dimension. Such simplification of
jurisdiction, however, is not without its exceptions and complications.
1.

Application of National Law

Although EC Member States may normally apply neither the merger
Regulation' 23 nor their own antitrust legislation to mergers of Community dimension, 12 4 the Commission may grant Member States permission to take limited measures1 2 5 to protect their markets.' 2 6 The
Commission may give such authorization when a national market is
affected at the local level and has all of the characteristics - based on
strict criteria - of a local rather than Community-wide market.' 27 The
Commission's decision on the application of national law is reviewable
1 28
by the Court of Justice.
While Member States may not apply their national antitrust law to
mergers with a Community dimension,' 2 9 they may take measures compatible with Community law to "protect legitimate interests other than
those taken into consideration by [the] Regulation."'130 Such interests
include public security, prudential rules for financial institutions, and
plurality ownership of the media. 13 ' Thus, the new Regulation only
preempts national antitrust law that governs the approval of mergers.
An important question is whether Member States can disallow mergers
approved by the Commission through application of law other than
national antitrust law. 132 Such a fiat would be undesirable because the
finality of Commission approval of any particular merger would become
uncertain. In any case, Member States cannot authorize mergers that
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at art. 21, § 1.
Id. at art. 21, § 2.
Id. at art. 9, § 8.
Compare id. at art. 21, § 2, with id. at art. 9, §§ 1-3.

127. Id. at art. 9, §§ 3, 7. This type of intervention is authorized on a case-by-case
basis. But where two-thirds of the revenue of each merging company comes from the
same Member State, the merger does not fall within the merger Regulation and is
reviewed only by national authorities. Id. at art. 1, § 2.
128. Id. at art. 9, § 9.
129. Id. at art. 21, § 2.
130. Id. at art. 21, § 3.

131. Id.
132. Id. at art. 21; see also Ferry & Vig, supra note 45, at 32, col. 3.
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the EC would otherwise prohibit.' 33
2. Private Actions and the Application of Articles 85 and 86
The Commission may not apply Articles 85 and 86 to mergers falling
within the scope of the new Regulation.' 3 4 It is unclear whether the
Regulation bans private actions. 135 Private actions, however, have "not
133. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 21, § 1.
134. Fine, supra note 21, at 523; see Regulation,supra note 2, at art. 22, § 2 (disallowing the Commission the use of Regulation 17, the enforcement mechanism of Articles 85 and 86).
135. Compare Fine, supra note 21, at 523 (citing a draft similar to the adopted version) with Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 22.
Fine and Hawk disagree as to whether the Regulation expressly allows private
actions. While Fine argues that the Regulation is unclear, Hawk maintains that under
certain bircumstances private actions are sanctioned by the Regulation. Although
Fine and Hawk cite different versions of the Regulation's amended drafts, the language in each draft is identical to the current Regulation. CompareAmended Proposalfor
a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 29 OJ. EUR.
COMM. (No. C. 22) 14 (1989) [hereinafter Fine's Draft], with Amended Proposalfor a
Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 31 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 130) 4, art. 22 (1988) [hereinafter Hawk's Draft], and Regulation,
supra note 2. Instead of arguing as Fine does that it is unclear whether private actions
will be prohibited, Hawk argues:
The draft provides that national competition laws (and the application of
Articles 85 and 86 in private actions before member state courts) are preempted where the Commission has authorized a merger covered by the Regulation. National competition laws (and Articles 85 and 86 in private
actions) are not preempted where the Commission either informs the parties
that it will not challenge or fails to challenge within the requisite period.
Thus Articles 85 and 86 may sometimes permit private parties (such as
targets of hostile takeover) to request member state courts to block mergers.
Hawk, supra note 3, at 312. Hawk thus concludes that private actions under Article
85 and 86 are not preempted where the Commission does not "challenge" the
merger.
Hawk's analysis may be flawed in two respects. First, Hawk's arguments depend
upon his interpretation of the Regulation's Article 22 (Article 21 in Hawk's draft).
Article 22 forbids the application of EC Regulation No. 17 to both mergers within the
Regulation's "scope" or to "concentrations as defined in Article 3." Compare Fine's
Draft, art. 21, with Hawk's Draft, art. 21, andRegulation, supra note 2, at art. 22. Regulation 17 is the enforcement mechanism for Article 85 and 86. Hawk also assumes in
the above passage that the "scope" of the merger Regulation includes only those
mergers challenged by the Commission. See Hawk, supra note 3, at 312. Hawk's argument thus suggests that actions under Articles 85 and 86 are permissible because
Article 22 only prohibits actions against mergers that the Commission has "challenged." But Hawk's interpretation of the term "scope" may be incorrect. The Regulation, including Hawk's Draft, initially defines "scope" in terms of "Community
dimension." Compare Hawk's Draft, art. 1, with Fine's Draft, art. 1, and Regulation,
supra note 2, at art. 22. Under this analysis, any merger with a "Community dimension" would be protected from action under Article 22.
Second, Hawk is incorrect in assuming that Regulation 17 applies to private
actions. Fine points out that Regulation 17 "only applies in a Commission investigation." Fine, supra note 21, at 523 (emphasis added). "Whether Regulation 17 would
prevent the use of Article 85 and 86 in private actions in the national courts is unclear."
Id. Thus, even though a merger may have "Community dimension," private actions
may not be barred under the merger Regulation. This is significant because it means
that a merger approved by the Commission may still be subject to suit under Articles
85 and 86 in EC Member State courts.
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yet play[ed] a large role in the EC."' 3 6 One commentator has stated
that private actions are infrequent because litigation costs are not adequately compensated in relation to the risks associated with an uncertain
outcome. I3 7 "[P]rivate actions for damages, although theoretically possible, are few, because of the absence of the lawyer incentives [as] in the
United States: treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs for prevailing
plaintiffs, contingency fees, and class actions."' 3 8 It is questionable
whether this will remain the case in light of increased merger activity in
39
Europe. 1
E.

Evaluation of "Benefits" for Non-EC Firms: Do the Burdens
Outweigh the Benefits?

The chief benefits under the Regulation are (1) a simplified application
process through exclusive Regulation by the EC Commission, (2) preimplementation approval of mergers when appropriate, 140 and (3) a
prescribed time limit for the Commission's decision. 14 1 Non-EC firms
seeking the benefits of the new Regulation, however, may encounter
four serious drawbacks. First, evaluation of mergers under the Regulation combines traditional competition policy concerns with economic
and technical objectives. Second, the politics of the various Member
States may influence Commission decisions. Third, even favorable decisions are subject to review and, consequently, the finality of a Commission decision is uncertain. Fourth, the Commission could conceivably
discriminate against non-EC firms.
1.

Problems with Multiple Policies

One commentator criticized the requirement in the initial draft of the
merger Regulation t 42 that the Commission evaluate mergers using a
Notably, there are many European markets which firms can "dominate" without
falling within the scope of the merger Regulation. See Korah & Lasok, supra note 32,

at 366. Consequently, EC Member State courts may frequently find it necessary to
allow private actions under Articles 85 and 86.
136. Hawk, supra note 3, at 308.
137. See id.

138. Id.
139. See Europe's Buyout Bulge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, at Fl, col. 2.

In the landmark case of Philip Morris, 1987 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 4487, the suit was
brought before the Commission not by the participants in the shareholders' acquisition, but by two other companies whose offers for equity purchases had been
rejected. See Korah & Lasok, supra note 32, at 333-34. Thus, private suits occur in
the EC despite the lack of "lawyer incentives."

While the financial incentives for private actions are not as great as in the United
States, such actions may serve as a defensive tactic for hostile acquisitions because
they delay the finality of any Commission decision. Ferry & Vig, supra note 45, at 32,

col. 4.
140. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 7, §§ 1-4.
141. Id. at art. 10, §§ 1-3.
142. Commission Proposalfora Regulation(EEC) of the Council on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 16 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 92) (1973) 1 (This is the original
proposal submitted by the Commission on 20 July 1973).
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mixture of both competition and "industrial" policy. 14 3 The problem
with this mixture of policies is that each policy is ideally served by a
different evaluative process.
"Industrial" policy consists of technological and economic objec144
tives that are distinct from traditional competition policy concerns.
In contrast to industrial policy, the purpose of traditional EC competition policy is "to attack market practices and structures which limit
existing, or potential competition in a substantial way," not "to ensure a
45
better regional allocation of activities or to safeguard employment." 1
Critics of the initial proposal for merger control recommended that
assessing the structure of competition within a market should be a separate task from promoting other Community policy objectives. 14 6 The
need for this separation stems from the fear that political input from the
various Member States, which is needed when articulating Community
economic and technological objectives, would only erode traditional
14 7
Furcompetition policy values, such as unrestrained competition.
thermore, the Commission is considered too "technocratic" to properly
articulate economic and technological objectives for the entire Commu148
nity; a more democratic process should define these objectives.
If this distinction [in the evaluative process] is not made, and if ...the
Commission is to resolve within itself the confrontation between the costs
and the benefits of the transaction, the technocratic arbitrage to which
this would give rise would dilute the efficacity of competition policy and
lead to the democratic processes being set aside in favour of internal
compromises involving politicians, senior officials and representatives of
the private sector.149
These criticisms are largely ignored in the new merger control Regulation. 150 Under the adopted Regulation, the Commission must con5
sider "industrial" policy in conjunction with competition policy.' '
Decisions concerning traditional competition policy concerns such as
free competition, as well as economic and technical objectives, require
input from Community leaders. 15 2 The lack of procedural separation
between evaluative criteria may subject non-EC firms to the influences
of political compromise and bureaucratic decision-making. Such influ143. A.Jacquemin, Concentrationand Mergers in the E.E.C.: Towards a System of Control

in EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL 155, 167 (K. Hopt ed. 1982); see also Weiler, supra
note 84, at 208-09.
144. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
145. Jacquemin, supra note 143, at 167.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id
149. See id.
150. The author of the above criticism also advocates that the Commission should
produce written decisions. See id. The adopted Regulation incorporates this suggestion. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 19, §§ 6-7.
151. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § 1; see also supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
152. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 19, §§ 3-4.
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ences will increase the unpredictability of Commission decisions and
hence heighten the risk to non-EC firms of falling under EC jurisdiction.15 3 Thus, the Regulation's lack of separation between review considering "industrial policy" and review considering traditional
154
competition policy deserves criticism.
2. Political Components of Commission Decisions
Exactly how the Commission's decisions will be influenced by political
input from various Member States should be considered. During the
four months when the Commission considers the compatibility of the
merger with competition policy,' 5 5 the Commission must remain "in
close and constant liaison" with the various Member States.' 5 6 The
Commission must give affected Member States the "opportunity to
make known their views at every stage of the procedure."' 157 In addition, the Commission must consult an advisory committee composed of
officials of the various Member States15 8 before declaring a merger
incompatible with competition policy. 159 The Commission must "take
the utmost account of the opinion delivered by the Committee"' 6 0 and
l6
inform the Committee of how it evaluated the Committee's opinion. '
6 2
This mechanism creates a basis for review by the Court of Justice.'
3. Judicial Review
16 3
The Commission's decisions are reviewable by the Court of Justice.
Judicial review threatens finality because Commission decisions on
either the merger's compatibility with competition policy or other EC
social, technological, and economic objectives are not necessarily final.
Criticism has been levied at this aspect of the Regulation. Critics argue
that the Court's opinion is not necessarily superior to the Commission's. 164 But such criticism may be unwarranted. The Court ofJustice
has historically utilized judges who were well-versed in economics. 1 6 5

153. The last draft of the Regulation prior to the adopted version would have

implemented distinct procedures for evaluating mergers under traditional competition policy and assessing them against technological and economic objectives. See
Proposal, supra note 77, at art. 2, §§ 2-3.
154. SeeJacquemin, supra note 143, at 167.
155. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 10.
156. Id. at art. 19, § 2.

157. Id.
158. Id. at art. 19, § 4.
159. Id. at art. 19, § 3. Note that the Advisory Committee must also be consulted
for fines and penalties and when considering the revocation of an earlier decision to

approve a merger. Compare id., with id. at art. 8, § 5, and arts. 14-15.
160. Id. at art. 19, § 6. Also note that the Advisory Committee must deliver its
opinion in writing. Id.

161. Id.
162. Id. at art. 21, § 1.
163. Id. at art. 21, § 1. The Court ofJustice also has authority to review fines and
penalties fixed by the Commission. Id. at art. 16.
164. Weiler, supra note 84, at 206.

165. See id. at 205.
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Furthermore, "[t]he European Court of Justice can re-evaluate the factual economic appreciation of the situation and not merely the legal consequences that follow from a given factual set up."'1 66 The Court's
ability to review economic questions of fact suggests that it is capable of
the rigorous economic analysis needed for evaluating mergers. Such
powers of review, however, may only complicate and further delay the
16 7
appellate process.
The EC recently created a lower EC court of "first instance."' 68 It
is uncertain how this new court will affect the review process for mergers. 16 9 Adding another step of appeal above the Commission, however,
further undermines the finality needed in the financing of merger operations. Combined with the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to review
questions of fact as well as law, the appellate process could become
quite cumbersome. But the added complexity resulting from judicial
170
review may be offset by the lack of enticements to litigate.
4.

DiscriminationAgainst Firmsfrom Non-EC Countries

Firms from non-EC countries are concerned that the Commission may
treat them unfairly. 17 1 The question of discrimination should be
addressed in terms of (1) the potential for discrimination and (2) the
policy rationales that would promote discriminatory rulings.
a.

The Potential for Discrimination

The Commission could potentially discriminate against firms from nonEC countries in several ways. First, the Commission could scrutinize
non-European firms under its competition policy more strictly than EC
firms. Since competition policy is derived from flexible components
166. Id.
167. Weiler argues that a separation of roles for the Commission and the various
Member States as well as a separation of competition policy and "political" decisions
would allow a better basis for judicial review. Id.; see also supra notes 146-49 and
accompanying text.
168. Council Decision (EEC) of 24 October 1988 on establishinga Court of FirstInstance of
the European Communities, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L319) 1 (1988), amended by 32 OJ.
EUR. COMM. (No. C215) 1 (1989).

169. Hawk describes the new court as similar to an intermediate U.S. court:
The new court will operate as an intermediate court between the Commission
and the Court ofJustice. Its jurisdiction will include review of Commission
actions in competition matters and perhaps trade cases as well. The new
court will have the effect of bringing EEC competition proceedings more into
line with U.S. litigation practices, for example greater use of economic evidence and arguments.
Hawk, supra note 3, at 313.
170. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
171. See Rivers & Vest, Making Deals in Post-1992 Europe, EUROPE, Oct. 1989, at 18,
46. See generally Rosenbaum, Fortress or Facade?, INDUSTRY Wx., Feb. 6, 1989, at 54;
Buchanan, Inside the Fortress: Europe after 1992, ELECrRONIC Bus., Oct. 15, 1988, at 38;
McClenahen, Europe 1992: The Challenge to the U.S., INDUSTRY Wx., Apr. 3, 1989, at

78; Weinberger, The Common Market-Friendor Foe?, FORBES, Mar. 6, 1989, at 31; Kirkland, Outsider's Guide to Europe in 1992, FORTUNE, Oct. 24, 1988, at 121.
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such as market share, product market, and geographic market, 172 the
Commission could analyze each of these components in a way unfavorable to non-Europeans. For example, the Commission could interpret
product market broadly or narrowly, thus allowing the greatest possibility of finding that the merger would create a position of "dominance."
The tolerable market share for dominance depends completely on the
Commission's interpretation. Likewise, geographic market also allows
some flexibility in interpretation. Hopefully, the Commission will be
impartial and consistent in its interpretation of the components of competition policy.
In addition, the approval of mergers as an exception to competition
policy requires the Commission to accept political input.'l7 Political
pressure may deter the Commission from finding in favor of non-European parties. Such pressure may also lead the Commission to refer non174
EC firms to EC Member States for the application of national law,
175
thus creating a two-tier system of review for non-EC firms.
The
extra-national review process would not only cause more mergers to be
rejected or subjected to stipulations, but it would also impede efforts to
obtain financing.
Pressure to apply national law can come from many sources. First,
EC Member States may pressure the Commission to allow the application of national law.1 76 Such pressure is possible because of the requirement that the Commission maintain a "constant liaison" with relevant
Member States. 17 7 Second, third parties affected by a merger who show
a "legitimate interest" are entitled to apply to the Commission for a
hearing. 17 8 Third, Commission decisions are reviewable by the Court of
Justice. 179 Thus, in applying the Regulation, the potential for discrimination does exist. This Note is intended to demonstrate that flexible,
politically sensitive areas of the Regulation would permit discrimination
against non-European firms.
b.

Policy Rationales that Could Result in Discrimination

There are several policy objectives incorporated into the Regulation
which could promote discrimination against non-European firms. These
policy objectives stem from concerns about unequal access to non-EC
172. See supra notes 76-107.
173. Compare Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § 2, with Regulation, at art. 8, § 2 and
Regulation, at art. 19, §§ 3, 6.
174. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
175. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 9, §§ 2-3. Even though the EC can refer
mergers to Member States, Member States may only take the measures "strictly nec-

essary to safeguard or restore effective competition ....

Id. at art. 9, § 8.

176. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text (discussing application of

national law).
177. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 19, § 2.
178. Id. at art. 18, § 4.

179. Id. at art. 21, § 1.
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markets and the economic and technological objectives of competition
policy.
First, the Commission has an express obligation to consider the
competitiveness of European firms in international markets when determining the impact of a merger on European markets. 8 0° Fairness in
terms of market share must be viewed in global terms, not just in relation to EC markets. The Commission's promotion of fair play on a
global scale may appear to be a discriminatory denial of a merger within
the Common Market. Furthermore, the Commission may discriminate
against non-EC multinationals by rigorously assessing the access other
EC firms have to non-Community markets enjoyed by the non-EC

multinationals.

181

The Commission may also discriminate against non-EC firms on the
basis of Community economic and technical objectives comprising competition policy.' 8 2 Even in addressing such objectives, the Commission
must consider international competition.' 8 3 For example, the EC has
decided to pursue certain social objectives in its company law: it has
proposed worker representation on the board of any firm incorporated
under EC company law. 184 Firms incorporated under the EC 18 5 as well
as firms incorporated in nations with similar requirements may protest
that it is unfair to compete with firms that are not required to have
worker representation (such as U.S. firms). Under the new merger Regulation, the Commission could approve a merger as compatible with the
Community's competition policy' 8 6 but attach "conditions and obligations" to ensure effective competition.' 8 7 Theoretically, in order to
ensure fairness in competition, the Commission could approve a merger
on the condition that the new entity allow worker representation on its
board. Because affected parties can be heard before the Commission,18 8 it is feasible that competing European industries with worker
representation on their boards will petition the Commission for such a
stipulation. Non-European firms forced to comply with the stipulation
could be at a disadvantage domestically because of a lack of similar labor
requirements in their native countries.
MI. International Antitrust Implications of the New Regulation
The new Regulation has antitrust implications reaching far beyond
Europe's boundaries. The antitrust implications stem from the fact that
180. Id. at art. 2, § 1(b).

181. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
182. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § 1(b).

183. Id. at art. 2, § 1.
184. Rivers & Vest, supra note 171, at 46.
185. Firms may incorporate under the EC. Amended Proposalfor Fifth Directive, 26
OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1401 (1983).

The ramifications of incorporation under the EC are beyond the scope of this Note.
186. Compare Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 8, § 2, with Regulation, at art. 2, § 1.

187. Id. at art. 8, § 2.
188. Id. at art. 18, § 1.
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the Regulation affects multinationals in a wide array of transactions,
including statutory mergers, asset sales, tender offers, minority share
189
acquisitions, and joint ventures.
A.

Jurisdictional Scope: Implications for non-EC Firms

The jurisdictional scope of the new Regulation will have substantial antitrust effects on non-EC firms. Notwithstanding the turnover requirements, 190 the merger Regulation has an additional geographic
jurisdictional test. The geographic test, along with an EC jurisdictional
doctrine known as the "economic entity" theory, t 9 ' works to extend the
Regulation's antitrust policies beyond the Common Market.
1.

Fundamental Geographic Tests forJurisdiction: "Substantial Operations"

A merger meets the geographic jurisdictional requirements of the Regulation in three ways. First, a merger has Community dimension and is
thus within the Regulation's jurisdiction if at least two of the undertakings affecting the merger have their "sole or main fields of activity" in
different Member States.' 9 2 Second, even if both parties to a merger
"act mainly in one and the same Member State," the merger would
nonetheless have a Community dimension if "at least one of them has
substantial operations in at least one other Member State . .. .,,19
Third, parties "which do not have their principal field of activities in the
Community" fall within the scope of the Regulation if the parties have
"substantial operations" in the Common Market. 194
There are justifiable concerns about each of the three tests. Under
the first test, the phrase "sole or main fields of activity" has not been
defined in the Regulation. Experts have predicted its probable
definition:
The Member State of incorporation will probably be irrelevant .... The
Commission probably will employ a test akin to the "nerve center" test
used in the United States. Under this test, the Commission would look to
the Member State containing the greatest concentration of the firm's
19 5
administrative, sales and manufacturing facilities.
Even if this "nerve center" test is adopted, the application of the "sole
or main field of Community activities" test does not provide parties to a
189. See infra notes 226-49 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.

191. According to the theory, the anti-competitive behavior of a subsidiary can be
attributed to its parent. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.

192. Fine, supra note 21, at 515; see also Regulation, supra note 2, preamble.
193. Regulation, supra note 2, preamble.
194. Id.
195. Fine, supra note 21, at 515-16 (discussing the definition of "principal field of
activity," which is essentially the same as "sole or main field of activity"). Fine argues
that the geographic test, even assuming the adoption of the nerve center test, is cur-

rently unworkable because of an absence of guidelines for firms that have split their
administration, sales, and manufacturing facilities into locations in two or more
Member States. Id. at 517.
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potential merger with a concrete rule as to whether they must file with
the Commission or with individual Member States. Squabbles over
jurisdiction could prove costly to parties needing to swiftly implement a
transaction.
In the second test, the meaning of the phrase "substantial operations" is indefinite. This term replaced the language of an earlier draft
that allowed jurisdiction if the proposed transaction would have an
"effect" in the Common Market (the "effects doctrine"). 1 96 "Substantial operations" seems to be a step away from the extreme form ofjurisdiction that would have been granted by the effects doctrine, at least in
its most pure form. It is unclear just how far the EC has moved from the
pure effects doctrine. The ambiguity of this language in the new Regulation could grant the Commission and the Court ofJustice great flexibility to determine the extent of their own jurisdiction over non-EC
firms.
The phrase "substantial operations" could accommodate a qualified
version of effects doctrine. In Re Wood Pulp Cartel, the European Court
rejected a "pure effects" theory. The Court found, however, that "nonEC companies, having no agents, offices or subsidiary [sic] in the community, could be subject to Community jurisdiction where the agreement or transaction is implemented in the Community."' 97 The European
Court of Justice has thus drawn a distinction between a transaction that
is "implemented" in the EC and a transaction that merely has some
effect upon European markets. "Implemented" connotes something
more than mere effect, such as an active presence in the Common Market. The distinction, although unclear, may be more akin to the "substantial operations" test now found in the Regulation.
The effects doctrine as modified under Wood Pulp did not require
198
in the EC
that the firms involved have agents, offices or subsidiaries
for the Court to find jurisdiction. An important issue under the new
Regulation is whether the Commission must determine that the parties
have "agents, offices or subsidiaries" to acquire jurisdiction. For
instance, jurisdiction could be granted merely because a party transacts
substantial business with EC firms. It is questionable whether "substantial operations" is satisfied by the physical presence of the firm or its
agents, or whether it simply requires that the firms involved have significant business relationships with the EC. The answer to these questions
ultimately depends upon whether the Commission and the Court ofJustice are willing to limit their own jurisdiction since they have been given
the discretion to resolve the issue through the ambiguous nature of the
term "substantial operations."
196. See, e.g., Proposal, supra note 77, preamble.

197. Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A Ahlstr6m OY v. EC Comm'n, 1988 E. Comm. Ct.J.

Rep. 5193, 4 Common Mkt. L.R. 901, 940-41 (1988) (emphasis added) [hereinafter

Wood Pulp]; see also Fine, supra note 21, at 517.
198. Wood Pulp, 1988 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 5193.
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Regardless of the definition of "substantial operations," it is qualified as a jurisdictional test by the Regulation's threshold requirements. 199 The 250 million ECU threshold requirement stipulates that
the "Community-wide" turnover of "each of at least two" of the participating firms be over 250 million ECU. 20 0 Thus, a merger does not fall
within the Regulation unless it has some substantial effect within the
Community. 20 1 Unless Wood Pulp has some relevance in the sense of
imposing a qualified effects doctrine, the only significant meaning of the
"substantial operations" test may be equated with the 250 million ECU
20 2
threshold requirement.
2.

The "Single Economic Entity" Theory

Akin to the effects doctrine is the theory of "single economic entity."
This theory extends the reach of the Regulation's jurisdictional language and, consequently, the Regulation's antitrust implications for the
global market. "By this theory, the anti-competitive conduct of an EC
subsidiary can be imputed to its non-EC parent where the latter in fact
controls the subsidiary." 20 3 This theory has been affirmed by the Euro204
pean Court of Justice, most notably in Continental Can.
For example, if an American firm wishes to buy a German firm
through a French subsidiary, under the economic entity theory the
transaction would fall within the jurisdiction of the merger Regulation
because the theory attributes the subsidiary's conduct to the American

firm. 20 5 More problematic is the case where an American firm uses its
German subsidiary to purchase a German firm. At first it would seem
that the EC does not have jurisdiction since both firms involved are German, but if the economic entity theory is applied and if the American
firm has substantial operations in any other EC country besides Germany, the EC has jurisdiction. 20 6 The rationale is that the German subsidiary's conduct is attributable to the American firm. Because the
199. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
200. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 1, § 2(b).
201. Namely, a Community-wide aggregate turnover of 500 million ECU.
202. It is possible that 250 million ECU in sales could be done through "middlemen" who in turn sell to EC countries. But given the large size of this threshold
amount, this scenario is unlikely. Furthermore, the Commission and Court ofJustice
may interpret "substantial operations" to include business relationships or even
complex schemes of distribution, thus retaining jurisdiction over firms utilizing middlemen for marketing their products in the EC.
203. Fine, supra note 21, at 517 (emphasis added).
204. Continental Can, 1973 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 215; see Fine, supra note 21, at 517
n.25; Schmitt, supra note 10, at 172-73.

205. Fine, supra note 21, at 517. Fine presents many excellent examples of the
jurisdictional requirements of an earlier draft of the merger Regulation that are in
harmony with the adopted Regulation. Id. Fine also points out that jurisdiction is
satisfied by the geographic criteria of the Regulation. Id. This is because the "sole
or main fields of activity" of one of the merging party's subsidiaries is in an EC country other than Germany. See Regulation, supra note 2, preamble. The ensuing examples were all originally presented by Fine. Fine, supra note 21, at 517-19.

206. Fine, supra note 21, at 517-18.
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American firm is active in EC countries other than Germany, the EC
20 7
rather than Germany has jurisdiction.
Still more problematic is the situation where an American firm, having no subsidiaries in any EC country, purchases a German firm directly.
Although the American firm may have its facilities in an EC country, the
economic entity theory will probably not apply since no subsidiaries are
involved;20 8 however, jurisdiction might be found under the "substantial operations test."'20 9 The question is 0to what extent the Commission
21
will apply the economic entity theory.
The Economic Entity Theory in Instances of Less than 100 Percent
Ownership
Not only does the economic entity theory affect parent-subsidiary relationships of 100 percent ownership, but it also permits the Commission
to find a "single economic entity" where one firm has substantially less
than complete ownership in another firm. In analyzing the effects of
investment under the economic entity theory, control is the essential
element: the Commission will find a single "economic entity" where
there is a relationship of control. 2 1 1 While control is obvious in parentsubsidiary relationships involving 100 percent ownership, control is less
apparent in contractual agreements or minority share interests. Factors
evidencing control include the following: (a) ownership or rights to use
all or part of the assets of an undertaking; and (b) rights or contracts
which confer decisive influence on the composition, voting, or decisions
of the organs of an undertaking. 2 12 The Regulation's definition of control is very broad. Ownership rights, voting rights, contract rights, and
management rights all evidence control.
The purchase of a majority of the stock or voting rights of a firm is
not required for the Commission to find control. In Philip Morris, the
European Court made it clear that the "acquisition of a minority shareholding in a competing company may constitute an infringement of Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty [of Rome]." '2 13 The actual test of PhilipMorris is
that control exists when the acquisition "distorts competition" in the
market of the buying and selling firms 2 14 or "the investing company
obtains legal or defacto control."'21 5 Even an agreement that "provides
for commercial co-operation between the companies or creates a struc-

3.

207. Regulation, supra note 2, preamble (necessity of one of the merging parties

having
State's
208.
209.
210.

substantial operations in another Member State); id at art. 21, § 2 (Member
legislation does not apply).
See id
See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.

See Fine, supra note 21, at 517-18.
211. Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J.

Rep. 223; see also Schmitt, supra note 10, at 174; and Fine, supra note 21, at 517.
212. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 3, § 3.

213. Philip Morris, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 4575. See generally Banks, supra
note 11, at 303-09.
214. Philip Morris, 1987 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 4577, at paragraph 37.

215. Id.
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ture likely to be used for such co-operation" is conclusive evidence of
control. 21 6 The Philip Morris definition of control has been used when
applying Article 85 to mergers. Because the new merger Regulation
allows for control through shareholding in other firms, 2 17 it is likely that
the Commission will use the Philip Morris principle when applying the
21 8
economic entity theory to minority shareholders.
B.

The Regulation of Multinationals
The competition policy of the merger Regulation targets multinationals.
One EC Commission spokesman stated, "The message is that any multinational that has substantial interests .in Europe or is thinking of
acquiring substantial interests in Europe will have to look to the commission in Brussels for agreement on its proposed merger. '2 19 With
the new merger Regulation, the EC can actively police large multinationals and implement antitrust policy on a global scale. Multinationals
by their very nature fall more readily within the merger Regulation's
scope and policies. For instance, "[m]ultinationals with a wide range of
products are more likely to acquire a market share of 20 to 25 percent of
the common market in a particular product through a merger. ' 220 An
unacceptable market share of only one product in any geographic market of Community dimension may jeopardize a merger. 221 Because of
the wide range of products and services produced by multinationals, it is
more likely for the Commission to assess multinationals unfavorably
under the merger control Regulation.
In many ways, the "substantial operations" test best demonstrates
the potential use of the merger control Regulation as an international
antitrust weapon. Prior to Wood Pulp22 2 - which adopted the effects
theory - a European authority argued that the EC would not utilize the
effects doctrine in merger control because the international antitrust
ramifications would be too broad.
Indeed from an economic political point of view a fully fledged adoption
of the effects theory would be extremely doubtful, perhaps dangerous:
should for example, the existence of a cartel of majorJapanese exporters
to the Common Market really be tackled on a strict legal antitrust basis, or
is it not rather a question ofJapanese commercial policy which should be
and can only effectively be tackled at the political level? It is perhaps with
this in mind that in the Community's proposed merger Regulation
a point
223
of contact with the Community is always insisted upon.
216. Id.
217. See Regulation, supra note 2,at art. 3, § 3; see also id. at art. 3, § 1(b).
218. So far PhilipMorrishas only been applied to horizontal mergers, but it may be
extended further. Korah & Lasok, supra note 32, at 367.
219. EuropeanAntitrust Agreement, supra note 2, at D2.
220. Schmitt, supra note 10, at 185. The presumption is in favor of the merger

below a 25 percent market share. Regulation, supra note 2, preamble; see supra notes
81-82
221.
222.
223.

and accompanying text.
See Hoffmann-La Roche, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 461.
Wood Pulp, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 193.
Weiler, supra note 84, at 208.
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Even though the EC has not expressly adopted the effects doctrine, the

vagueness of the "substantial operations" test raises two questions: (1)
Will the EC use the merger Regulation for international trust-busting;

and (2) Should the EC use the Regulation for such a purpose?
As evidence of its potential trust-busting powers, the Commission
may both approve mergers under the Regulation and stipulate the conditions for such approval. 2 24 The authority to conditionally approve
mergers is a powerful tool for the implementation of EC policy. Firms
rejecting EC stipulations may opt to abandon European operations. 2 25
Using access to its own markets as an incentive, the EC has leverage to
implement its own antitrust policies and promote its own conception of
fairness in international markets.
C. Deals Affected Other than Traditional Mergers
1.

Asset Sales

Along with statutory mergers, asset sales are regulated by the EC
merger Regulation. The Regulation's definition of "concentration" 226
2 27
includes not only mergers, but also share purchases and asset sales.
"A concentration shall be deemed to arise where... one or more undertakings acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract
or by any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of
one or more other undertakings. ' 22 8 Acquisition of "control" is the
determinative test of this definition. This language is designed to
encompass a broad array of transactions, thus making it very difficult to
structure a transaction that avoids the EC Regulation.
Under the Regulation, control of "parts" of an undertaking will
ensnare asset lockups 2 29 if the transaction meets the threshold requirements. In calculating threshold turnover, however, "only the turnover
relating to the parts which are the subject of the transaction shall be
taken into account with regard to the seller or sellers." 2 30 Thus, in asset
sales where only a part of a firm is sold, the seller's turnover is limited to
23
the part or parts being sold. '
224. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 8, § 2.

225. See Rivers &Vest, supra note 171, at 46 (arguing the pressure to divest is a real
threat).
226. The Regulation speaks of "concentrations" instead of "mergers." This is a
better term than "mergers," since "merger" may be narrowly defined as a statutory
merger or broadly defined to include tender offers, asset sales, and share exchanges.
227. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 3, § 1.

228. Id. at art. 3, § 1(b).
229. Asset lockups are options to purchase key "parts" of a firm. Selling firms
grant lockups to third parties in order to make their firms less attractive to hostile
bidders in a takeover acquisition. Lockups are also used to induce new parties to
enter a bidding contest for a firm.

230. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 5, § 2.
231. The normal rules for inclusion in the turnover calculation, however, apply for
the buyer. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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Takeover Bids and Stock Acquisitions

Under the merger Regulation's definition of concentration, it will apply
to both friendly and hostile takeovers. 23 2 Takeover bids are the subject
of an EC directive 23 3 adopted by the Commission in December of
1988.234 The takeover directive governs the actual bidding process and
is aimed at fairness and protection of shareholders. 23 5 In contrast, the
new merger Regulation administers competition policy, ensuring that
23 6
markets are free from monopolies created by hostile tender offers.
As discussed above, the Commission has applied Article 85 to the
acquisition of minority shareholdings. 23 7 The crucial test is not the percentage of ownership acquired, but whether the acquisition has the
effect of "distorting competition." 23 8 When distortion of competition
results from an investing firm obtaining "legal or de facto control," the
Commission may apply Article 85.239 Since the Commission has
232. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 3, § 1; see also Fine, supra note 21, at 515. A
concentration results when a firm acquires control over a division of a company. Id.
233. Proposalfor a Thirteenth Company Law Directive: Take-over and Other General Bids,
[Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 60,200.
234. Id at 60,125. The Commission adopted the proposal, but it still has to be
adopted by the Council by a qualified majority. Id. at 60,125, 60,170. The various
Member States will have to modify their own legislation to comply with the EC plan.
See Basaldfia, Towards the Harmonization of EC Member States' Regulations on Takeover Bids:
The Proposalfor a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
487 (1989).
235. Basaldfia, supra note 234, at 488. The takeover regulation does not cover all
aspects of takeovers. Id. at 500.
236. Id. In addition to the takeover directive, which deals with the mechanics of
bidding, and the merger Regulation, several other regulations affect hostile takeovers. An adopted Directive addresses disclosure of major shareholdings. See 31
OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 348) 62 (1988); see also Basaldfia, supra note 234, at 500. The
Commission has also not yet addressed, although it is planning to, permissible
defense measures for corporations subject to hostile takeovers. Id. The steady development of regulations for takeovers has evolved as part of the EC's plan to implement its company law. See R. BUXBAUM & K. HoP'r, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAw HARMONIZATION POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE U.S.A. 232 (1988).

237. Philip Morris, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4487.
238. See id at 4577; see supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
239. Philip Morris, 1987 E.Comm. Ct. J.Rep. at 4577. In affirming the Commission's decision in Philip Morris, the Court ofJustice declared that Article 85 applies to
stock acquisitions when any one of the following conditions is met:
1) the shareholding results in legal or de facto control; 2) the agreement
gives the acquiror the possibility of reinforcing its position later; 3)the agreement provides for commercial cooperation; 4)the shareholding requires the
firms to take into consideration the other's interest when determining commercial policy. Hawk, supra note 3, at 310-11. From this list, it is clear that a
finding of 51% control is not necessary for the Commission to apply Article
85.
In PhilipMorris both the Commission and the Court ofJustice found "that the 24.9
percent voting rights and restrictions on future transfers of stock did not meet any of
these [the above] conditions, at least where the Commission imposed protective measures." Id. at 311 (emphasis added). Thus, in at least one case, one firm's acquisition
of 24.9% of the voting rights of another firm did not result in the Commission disallowing the transaction under Article 85. Under the new Regulation, the Commission
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applied Article 85 to minority shareholder acquisitions, the Commission
may apply the merger control Regulation to shareholder purchases
through use of the "economic entity" theory. 240 Such application of the
"economic entity" theory raises concerns for undertakings which invest
in the stock of other firms that share similar EC markets.
will exhibit a similar degree of tolerance dependant upon the facts and circumstances
of the actual case.
The facts of Philip Morris illuminate how the Court ofJustice might treat minority
shareholding acquisition agreements under the new Regulation. In PhilipMorris, the
original agreement that was challenged before the Commission allowed Philip Morris
to buy half of Rothmans Tobacco Holdings from another firm, Rembrandt Group
Limited. Rothmans Tobacco Holdings owned roughly half of a competitor of Morris,
Rothmans International. The merits of the case, however, were decided based upon
a second agreement between Philip Morris and Rembrandt.
In the later agreement, Philip Morris owned just under 25% of the voting rights
and 30.8% of the equity of Rothmans International. In addition, a "poison pill" plan
prevented any other competitor from acquiring influence in Rothmans by purchasing
shares from either Morris or Rembrandt. Korah & Lasok, supra note 32, at 333-35. It
was this later agreement, with a lesser shareholding and an accompanying poison
pill, that both the Court and Commission validated. The Court refused to strike
down the agreement under Article 85 because of "the fact that the companies in
question had 'remained independent after the entry into force of the agreements.' "
Banks, supra note 11, at 307 (emphasis in original). See generally id. at 304-05. The
Court even found it unlikely that the two firms would forebear from competing with
each other. Id. at 305.
Thus, the preservation of competition is the crucial factor that the Court ofJustice
and the Commission will look to in assessing the validity of minority shareholding
acquisitions. Similar principles will guide the new merger Regulation in its
application.
240. Banks argues that Philip Morris does not apply to merger agreements. Banks,
supra note 11, at 308. It might therefore be argued that the principles of PhilipMorris
do not apply to the merger control regulation. But it should be remembered that
Banks analyzes the application of Article 85 to minority shareholder purchases and
not how the "economic entity theory" allows the new Regulation to reach such
purchases. Because of the "economic entity theory," assessments of control and the
principles of PhilipMorris are relevant. For discussion of the economic entity theory,
see supra notes 203-18 and accompanying text.
While a 51% control requirement is sometimes applied in the calculation of turnover, see Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 5, § 4(b); and supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text, no such similar requirement is imposed upon the jurisdictional scope of
the Regulation. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 3. Thus, minority shareholding
acquisitions are not barred from the Regulation's jurisdiction by any threshold ownership test. See id. In addition, the turnover of the party acquiring a minority shareholding interest will not escape the turnover calculation. See id. at art. 5, § 4(a). The
only time the 51% test applies is in the calculation of turnover as it relates to subsidiaries of the transacting parties. Compare id., with id. at art. 5, § 4(b).
While a 51% ownership test is not determinative, control determines whether a
transaction falls within the scope of the Regulation. Compare id. at art. 1, § 1, with id.
at art. 3, § 1(b). The merger control Regulation states that control consists of "rights
or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions
of the organs of an undertaking." Id at art. 3, § 3(b). Under this definition control
may be acquired, in certain circumstances, by the acquisition of a minority
shareholding.
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3. Joint Ventures and PartialMergers
Joint ventures also fall within the scope of the merger control Regulation. The Regulation applies to joint ventures that have "all the functions of... autonomous economic entit[ies]," 24 1 its purpose being not
to effect the "coordination of the competitive behavior" of the parties. 24 2 In essence, parties to a joint venture must continue to compete
and must not allow the joint venture to function as an independent
entity. "Partial mergers, or joint ventures in which the parties cease
competing with respect to the products concerned, would be subject to
the ... Regulation." 243 Consequently, joint ventures that affect competition or function as independent entities must meet the merger Regula24 4
tion's requirements.
The Commission's exact definition of a joint venture is somewhat
tenuous. 24 5 The Commission has contented itself with saying simply
that ajoint venture is "generally defined as an enterprise subject to joint
control by two or more undertakings which are economically independent of each other." 24 6 The Commission has included within this definition joint buying agencies, joint selling agencies, and joint R&D
companies, as well as more separate entities with independent economic
lives of their own. The possible arrangements under the umbrella of
"joint venture" cover a broad range. However, one common feature is
that their creation results from a pooling of resources by the parent
companies. Structurally, therefore, they may be regarded as mergers or,
since only a part of the parents' resources are merged, what are frequently called in the EC "partial mergers." 24 7 The breadth of the Commission's definition of "joint venture" should function as a warning to
241. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 3, § 2.
242. Id.
243. Fine, supra note 21, at 515 (Fine is discussing a proposed draft regulation, but
the same analysis applies to the adopted version). See Fine's Draft, supra note 135.
Concerning the singleness of policy between joint ventures and mergers, the Economic and Social Committee of the EC has stated:
Supervision of mergers is linked to that of joint ventures, for which a clear
definition is required. The forthcoming guidelines should be in line with the
Commission's stance on merger supervision, the aim being once again to
enhance the legal certainty of the environment in which firms must compete.
Parameters should in any event be fixed with due regard to competition
from outside the Community covering a wide variety of considerations such
as the number of operators, the level of output and advanced technology,
synergy and economies of scale.
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVENTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION

POLICY 268,

2.6 (1988).

244. Schmitt, supra note 10, at 183.
245. The Court ofJustice had not been asked to review any of the Commission's
decisions on joint ventures. Banks, supra note 11, at 286.
246. COMMISSION FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 37 (1975); CoMMISSION THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
53 (1984) (original footnote
renumbered).
247. Banks, supra note 11, at 287. For a discussion of the Commission's regulation
ofjoint ventures and partial mergers under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome,

see id. at 286-309.
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firms entering joint ventures. Such firms could unwittingly create an
obligation to file with the Commission. Combined with the Regulation's
application to non-EC firms, the regulation of joint ventures under a
very broad definition has quite troubling international antitrust
implications.
Prior to the enactment of the new Regulation, the Commission
applied Article 85 to joint ventures by considering the following factors:
1. Will the establishment of the joint venture lead to a reduction in
the number of competitors on that market? Or to a diminution
of competitive enthusiasm?...
2. Will there be a reduction of competition on the other markets as
a result of the parents' cooperation in the joint venture?...
3. Will entry barriers [for new competitors] be raised?
These questions enable the Commission to examine, again, whether
the parent companies would have entered the market in absence of the
joint venture, whether the benefits of the joint venture could not be
achieved by some other arrangement that is regarded as less likely to prejudice patterns of competition, and whether-in view of the number of
firms, competing technologies, and so
on-the market strength of the
24 8
joint venture is likely to be excessive.
The anti-competitive effects of a joint venture were carefully scrutinized under Article 85. The new Regulation does not reveal in detail
the factors the Commission will assess in determining a joint venture's
validity. The Commission will probably consider the same factors when
applying the new merger Regulation to joint ventures that it used in the
24 9
application of Article 85 to such agreements.
D.

Summary of International Antitrust Implications

The Regulation's authority over a broad range of transactions, its broad
geographic reach, and its targeting of multinationals gives the Regulation international significance as an antitrust weapon. The Regulation is
not designed merely to regulate mergers within Europe. First, the Regulation covers transactions that fall outside of the broadest definition of
the term "merger." It not only affects mergers, asset sales, and tender
offers, but also minority share purchases and joint ventures. Secondly,
the Regulation extends far beyond Europe. Firms merging anywhere in
the world will fall within the scope of the Regulation if the merger is
248. Id. at 299-300.
249. Such factors will be considered in light of the Regulation's criteria for determining if a concentration is compatible with Community competition policy. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § 1.
The Commission's application of Article 85 to joint ventures has been criticized as
too harsh. Banks, supra note 11, at 301. Indeed, the Commission has indicated that
too many joint ventures have been banned under Article 85, and that the "pro-competitive nature" of joint ventures should be emphasized. Id. at 302. The problem
seems to be that Article 85 was ill-suited for joint ventures. See id. at 300-02. Hopefully, the merger control Regulation will not run into similar difficulties.
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sufficiently large and if the merging parties have "substantial operations" in the Common Market. Third, the Regulation is designed to
snare an important class of multinational players, the multinational corporation. Under the most extreme application, the EC could use the
Regulation to dismantle cartels or at least decrease their influence and
to regulate the competitiveness of large corporate multinationals. Thus,
the Regulation has implications far beyond the mere simplification of
mergers and acquisitions within Europe.
IV. European Competitiveness
Besides simplifying access to European merger markets and creating
global antitrust implications, the new Regulation will affect firms from
non-EC countries in one other significant way - it will promote European competitiveness in the international arena. The Regulation will
facilitate the competitiveness of European firms in two ways: (1) European firms will more easily grow to the size of international conglomerates, and (2) the Regulation will exert indirect pressure for European
access to international markets.
A.

Promoting the Growth of Firms from EC Member States

Under Article 2 of the merger Regulation, the Commission may authorize a merger, even if it somewhat restrains competition, if the merger
promotes European technological or economic progress 25 0 and is other'2 5 1
wise beneficial for the "the structure of all the markets concerned,"
including the "demand trends for the relevant goods and services, [and]
the interest of the intermediate and ultimate consumers. ' 25 2 Through
these requirements EC drafters have provided for the growth and stimulation of European firms.
The goal of encouraging growth of Common Market industry is
even more significant in light of the current restructuring of Europe's
253
corporate climate through a wave of mergers and consolidations.
These transactions are motivated by the anticipated benefits of Europe's
plans for economic integration by 1992. The new Regulation is both a
product of these restructuring intentions and a tool for the realization of
such objectives. 2 54 As evidence of the use of mergers to increase the
competitiveness of European firms, one authority stated:
250. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § 1(b). The flexibility which permits minor
restraints of competition is found in the Regulation's language about significant
impediments to competition, id. at art. 2, 99 2-3, and the Regulation's host of factors
that are to be considered when evaluating a transaction for compatibility. Id. at art.
2, § 1; see also supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
251. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § 1(a).
252. Id. at art. 2, § 1(b).
253. See generally Spellman, 1992 Prompts Unprecedented Wave of Mergers, EUROPE,
Dec. 1988, at 26; Kirkland, Merger Mania Is Sweeping Europe, FORTrUNE, Dec. 19, 1988,
at 157; Europe's Buyout Bulge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, at Fl, col. 2.
254. See Rivers & Vest, supra note 171; see also EuropeanAntitrustAgreement, supra note
2, at DI.
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This new merger authority will certainly see the necessity of stopping
abusive mergers, but equally important, it will seek to permit mergers that are
of a Pan-Europeaninterest ....For certain European industries to grow to

the level of the United States
and Japan, Europe must have a more
25 5
enlightened merger policy.
With the new merger Regulation, the EC hopes to increase opportunities for its own firms.
B.

Promoting International Fairness

Not only does the EC hope to promote mergers that will benefit the
Common Market within its own borders, but it also hopes to use the
Regulation to promote fairness for European firms in other international markets. For example, prior to the adoption of the final version of
the Regulation, the EC Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER) "was instructed to investigate the conditions in which the
Community could realise its desire to ensure that Community enterprises should have better access to acquisitions in the international market." 256 By ordering COREPER to make this investigation, the
Commission was studying ways to draft the Regulation so that it could
be used to promote European interests in markets outside of the EC.
Thus, the new Regulation was drafted to promote the interests of
EC firms in international markets. Under Article 24 of the Regulation,
"Member States shall inform the Commission of any general difficulties
encountered by their undertakings with concentrations . . . in a non-

member country." 25 7 In addition, the Commission must submit regular
reports to the Council of Ministers on the treatment of EC firms in nonEC countries.2 58 The Commission also has authority to submit proposals to the Council that will rectify any unfair treatment abroad. 2 59 Fairness for EC firms in all international markets is a significant policy
objective of the new Regulation.
The Regulation's competition policy will be affected by the EC's
concern with international fairness for European firms. The Commission evaluates mergers against competition policy criteria of "actual and
potential competition, both inside and outside the community." 2 60 The
policy behind the Regulation's evaluative criteria is a commitment to
26
promoting fairness for European firms on an international scale. '
255. EuropeanAntitrust Agreement, supra note 2, at D1 (emphasis added). It should

not be thought that the merger Regulation is concerned only with European performance in the global theater. The merger Regulation operates as an antitrust

device at a strictly European level while at the same time "breaking down... national
economic boundaries" within Europe. Weiler, supra note 84, at 204-05.
256. Council Makes Some Progresson MergerControl Regulation, [Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 95,283 (Nov. 1989).
257. Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 24, § 1.

258. Id. at art. 24, § 2.
259. Id. at art. 24, § 3.
260. EuropeanAntitrust Agreement, supra note 2, at D2 (emphasis added); see also Regu-

lation, supra note 2, at art. 2, § 1(a).
261.

See supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
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The Commission has some leverage in promoting its own conception of fairness. Under the Regulation, a merger could be permitted on
the condition that it meets stipulations that would promote fairness of
competition for EC firms. 26 2 For example, the Commission could permit an American firm to acquire a European company provided that the
American firm stop abusing its dominant market position in Latin
America. The Commission's evaluation of non-EC markets indirectly
creates pressure for European access to international markets. Non-EC
firms could be forced to either compete more fairly outside the EC or to
divest their interests in the EC and forego possible merger ventures.
C.

Summary of Effects on European Competitiveness

The new Regulation will affect firms from non-EC countries by promoting fairness for European firms in all international markets and by
encouraging the growth of European conglomerates. The new Regula-"
tion creates the format for a restructuring of the European corporate
environment and could potentially contribute to the reshaping of the
entire international corporate community. The impact of this Regulation on European competitiveness should not be underestimated.

Conclusion
The new EC merger Regulation is not simply an inter-European Regulation. It will affect non-EC companies, not only by providing business
opportunities in Europe, but by requiring large firms to constantly consider the EC ramifications of mergers, asset sales, tender offers, joint
ventures, and other similar transactions implemented anywhere in the
world. The scope of the Regulation's application prompts the question:
to what extent will the EC use the Regulation as an international antitrust weapon? Europe has a stated interest in promoting the growth of
its own multinationals and is keenly aware of the need to use the merger
Regulation to ensure market structures favorable to EC firms, not only
in Europe, but in other international markets as well. The new Regulation gives the EC leverage to pressure non-EC firms into creating
favorable market structures abroad in exchange for access to EC merger
markets. The new Regulation is a major development in international
antitrust law, with potentially real, historical significance.
Paul D. Callister

262. See Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 8, § 2. The Court of Justice may review
these stipulations. Id. at art. 21, § 1.

